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INTRODUCTION
Global climate change is the greatest environmental challenge facing the world today. The most urgent issue is how to prevent further
accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) that will only fuel the
process. The next priority is to implement adaptive measures, limiting harm to the extent that climate change cannot be avoided. Some
degree of climate change is inevitable, imposing substantial cost to society in the form of direct harm and adaptation expenses. It is not too
soon to begin considering how these costs will be allocated. In particular, we should begin to consider whether some of the damages
should be shifted from victims of climate change to responsible par1
ties, such as large-scale emitters of GHGs.
The reality is that, whatever mitigation measures are adopted, a
2
significant degree of climate change seems unavoidable. The best
†
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1
For the purposes of this Article, I will not undertake to review the evidence for
the reality and seriousness of climate change and the role of GHG emissions in producing climate change. Readers who remain skeptical of this point might begin with
Part I of the recent Stern Review from the British government. NICHOLAS STERN, STERN
REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1-61 (2007). A prepublication version
of the Stern Review is available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/
stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm.
2
As Donald Brown describes:
Many scientists and policy makers believe that a doubling of CO2 from preindustrial levels to 560 ppm may be unavoidable in the 21st century. This is so
because the world’s political and economic system cannot respond rapidly
enough to make faster changes in some major polluting sources such as gasoline-powered automobiles or coal-fired power plants. Some environmentalists, however, believe it is still possible to stabilize GHG[s] at 450 ppm, a level
that would limit the temperature increase (in addition to that which has already been caused by human activities) to 1.5 to 2 degrees F° during the next
100 years. Virtually nobody believes that it is possible to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations below 450 ppm and concentrations could continue growing
after that if third world countries do not implement aggressive reduction
strategies, even if the most ambitious proposal currently under consideration
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current estimate is that a doubling of CO2 from preindustrial levels
would result in a temperature increase between 1.5°C and 4.5°C
3
(2.7°F to 8.1°F) by the end of this century. For this reason, even in
the best-case scenario, we will be faced with a number of adverse impacts from climate change—and indeed, we are already experiencing
them:
[M]any of the climate impacts identified by IPCC [Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change] are likely to occur regardless of the nature of
the international policy response. In fact, the IPCC has recently concluded that regional changes in climate, particularly increases in temperature, have already affected a diverse set of physical and biological
systems in many parts of the world. Examples of observed changes
caused by human releases of GHG include shrinkage of glaciers, thawing
of permafrost, later freezing and earlier break-up of ice on rivers and
lakes, lengthening of mid-to [sic] high-latitude growing seasons, poleward and altitudinal shifts of plants and animal ranges, declines of some
plant and animal populations, and earlier flowering of trees, emerging
4
of insects, and egg-laying in birds.

Designing a fair and efficient system of compensation for climate
change damage poses great challenges. In this Article, my goal is only
to start the process of thinking through these issues. In particular, I
will try to show how certain kinds of injuries could be the subject of a
workable compensation system. These injuries—involving changes in

were adopted. Even if all nations could have stabilized emissions in the year
2002, the concentrations of GHGs would continue to rise and would approach
500 ppm by the year 2100. After that, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere
would continue to rise for several hundred years before stabilization would be
achieved. Even to stabilize CO2 at 1,000 ppm will require reductions of emissions below current levels.
Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit Global Warming
Commitments, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,741, 10,756 (2002) (footnotes omitted). For a general survey of climate change impacts and mitigation strategies, see
Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with author).
3
Richard A. Kerr et al., Latest Forecast: Stand by for a Warmer, but Not Scorching,
World, 312 SCIENCE 351, 351 (2006). For an up-to-date source of information on climate science, see RealClimate, http://www.realclimate.org (last visited May 1, 2007).
4
Brown, supra note 2, at 10,756. The most recent IPCC findings are available in
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP I,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 7-9 (2007), available at http://
ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_SPM.pdf. For further details on the effects
of climate change in the United States, see CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR GALBRAITH,
OBSERVED IMPACTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S. 17-34 (2004), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/observedimpacts/
index.cfm.
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basic geographic characteristics such as sea level or permafrost—are
readily identifiable, do not raise the complicated causation issues that
plague other potential forms of damages, and can be measured (at
least roughly) in a fairly straightforward way.
In the interest of manageability, I will give only passing attention
to two other important issues. The first is whether compensation of
any kind is warranted in this situation. I think the answer is yes, but
the question is obviously a controversial one, and I will provide only a
sketch of the justification for compensation. Instead, I will be more
concerned with assessing the relative attractiveness of various potential
compensation claims. The objective is to identify the core claims that
should be given the highest priority, assuming any claims at all are
compensated. A second question is what kind of institutional process,
such as litigation or an administrative compensation scheme, should
be used. I will discuss the alternatives briefly in order to demonstrate
that the options extend well beyond conventional litigation, but the
choice between institutional forms is too complicated to address fully
5
here.
To provide a concrete context for the discussion, however, it may
be helpful to sketch one possible compensation system. Consider an
international compensation commission. The commission would receive claims from countries that have incurred adaptation expenses
such as strengthening sea walls or providing alternative sources of
ecosystem services to replace lost wetlands. The commission would
determine which adaptation expenses were reasonable and would
schedule them for compensation. Compensation might come directly
from an international fund; however, an alternative payment system
might be more appealing if an international trading system for GHGs
were in place. In this alternative way of financing compensation, a set
number of GHG allowances could be set aside for the commission’s
use. The commission would use these allowances to pay claims; in
turn, the claimants could sell them to GHG emitters on the open
market. The net effect would be that the sources doing the least to
reduce their emission levels, and therefore having the greatest need to
purchase additional emission permits, would indirectly provide compensation for the expenses of adaptation. Thus, a wealth transfer
would take place from poorly controlled sources of GHGs to the vic-

5

A third question is whether existing domestic or international laws provide a
remedy for victims. This is obviously an important issue, but it is not one that I will try
to resolve here.
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tims of climate change. This is only one possible implementation; for
example, it is easy to imagine a similar program being established
within the United States, or to envision compensation proceeding
through a grant program rather than through adjudication. No plausible system will precisely measure harm and match victims with historic GHG emitters, but some form of rough justice seems achievable.
The primary goal of this Article is to identify a manageable subset
of environmental harms that could be the subject of such a compensation system. Part I reviews the expected impacts of climate change
and provides background on climate change litigation. Litigation
provides one possible source of compensation but is not the most
promising alternative. In search of guidance for providing climate
change compensation, Part II examines other compensation schemes,
dealing with an array of harms ranging from oil spills to terrorist acts.
These compensation schemes vary in their institutional forms, in what
damages are compensable, and in their treatment of causation and
fault issues. Part III attempts to identify some core, highly foreseeable
harms resulting from climate change and suggests methods for measuring damages. Compensation for these harms could be provided in
various institutional forms. The most likely claimants would be governments rather than individuals; funding could come from assessments against GHG sources or payments by high emission nations.
My purpose is not to offer a fully matured blueprint for compensation. It is to put some basic ideas on the table and to suggest that at
least part of the compensation issue is relatively manageable. In the
end, the decision of whether to compensate will be driven largely by
political decision makers rather than by courts or, even less likely, by
scholars. Whether a large-scale compensation plan will ever be
adopted, let alone when such a step might be taken, remains unclear.
Even at this early stage, however, it is useful to imagine the outlines of
a compensation scheme. Doing so may help focus the debate on
whether or not to compensate, and it will provide a useful head start
on actual programmatic design if the decision is ultimately made to
provide compensation.
In a country whose political process is only now awakening to the
reality of the climate change issue, it may seem almost utopian to
worry about compensation. Current litigation is likely to attract more
attention to the issue, as will some current endorsements of the idea
in international law. If the issue is not in the forefront today, it seems
safe to predict that it will be soon.
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I. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND LITIGATION
As background for discussing compensation, we need to begin by
surveying some of the likely impacts of climate change that might
support compensation claims. In addition, although no successful
compensation claims yet exist, we need to consider the state of affairs
in climate change litigation. Courts have at least begun to acknowledge the reality of harm from climate change—even in the United
States, where the official governmental position is more skeptical. In
particular, the Supreme Court recently held that injury from climate
6
change is sufficiently tangible and direct to form a basis for standing.
This holding is not directly relevant to compensation claims, but
seems likely to foster arguments that compensation is desirable.
A. Adverse Impacts of Climate Change
In designing a basic compensation scheme, we can put aside two
kinds of impacts, even though these impacts are important in considering adaptation and mitigation. First, we can put aside effects that
are extremely diffuse. These are less likely to be clearly identifiable as
impacts of climate change or to have identifiable groups of victims
who might seek compensation. Diffuse claims are also more likely to
receive lower priority than compensation of more concentrated
harms. For example, individuals’ increased air conditioning costs do
7
not seem like compelling candidates for compensation.
Second, we can also put aside for now the potential of climate
“surprises”—unlikely (but possible) catastrophic events, such as the
collapse of the Antarctic or Greenland ice caps (which would cause
8
cataclysmic changes in sea level), or the destruction of the Gulf
9
Stream (which would massively impact European weather). What-

6

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). For further discussion of this
case and its holding, see infra note 32.
7
On the other hand, programs implementing precautions against deaths from
heat waves, which might include subsidized air conditioning, do seem like plausible
items for compensation.
8
See Richard B. Alley et al., Ice-Sheet and Sea Level Changes, 310 SCIENCE 456, 457-60
(2005) (assessing this threat).
9
Richard A. Kerr, Confronting the Bogeyman of the Climate System, 310 SCIENCE 432,
432 (2005) (explaining that rapid collapse of the Atlantic circulation system is now
considered unlikely). Notably, current models do not include meltwater from
Greenland (suggesting that such models are “not entirely realistic”). Id. at 433. Even
apart from the possibility of unforeseen future increases in melt rates, the omission of
this factor from models means that their sea level predictions are probably too low.
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ever compensation is offered for such extraordinary events is likely to
be ad hoc and dictated largely by immediate political pressures.
Moreover, calculation of compensation is likely to take a back seat to
more urgent expenditures for adaptation and humanitarian aid.
At least for purposes of a first “cut” at the compensation issue, it
seems better to start with mid-range impacts—impacts involving significant, but not catastrophic, costs that are likely to occur and can be
10
clearly identified as consequences of climate change. This, in itself,
is a large universe and likely to grow as our knowledge of climate
change improves. For purposes of exploration, we can begin by identifying three major categories of harm that fit this description.
The first category involves harm to natural systems that react particularly strongly to temperature changes. There is considerable evidence, for example, that coral reefs have been damaged by climate
11
change. At the other climatic extreme, glaciers and areas of tundra
are being heavily impacted. Almost a quarter of the land in the
Northern Hemisphere is situated on permafrost, much of which
12
seems to be melting rapidly. Arctic Sea ice is also shrinking at a sur13
prising rate. The effects of these changes on native populations may
be particularly dramatic. To quote an Inuit hunter, “[o]f the people
involved in global warming, I think we’re on top of the list of who
would be most affected. . . . Our way of life, our traditions, maybe our
14
families. Our children may not have a future.” It is not clear how

10

In suggesting that the other possibilities be put aside in the discussion of compensation, I do not mean to imply that they should be disregarded in terms of preventative measures, whether those measures address adaptation or mitigation. Even very
unlikely events are worth attending to if the costs are sufficiently high. It also should
be noted that there is still considerable uncertainty at the high end of climate change
estimates. The Stern Review indicates that “there is up to a one-in-five chance that the
world would experience a warming in excess of 3°C above pre-industrial [levels] even if
greenhouse gas concentrations were stabili[z]ed at today’s level of 430 ppm CO2.”
STERN, supra note 1, at 11-12. Most of the impacts discussed in this Article assume a
warming of only 2°C. In the range between 2°C and 3°C, “the Earth would reach a
temperature not seen since the middle Pliocene around 3 million years ago.” Id. at 12.
11
See Denis Culley, Global Warming, Sea Level Rise and Tort, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
91, 95 & n.35 (2002) (noting a significant decline in coral reproduction rates in
warmer waters).
12
ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 13-15 (2006); see also id. at 13 (noting that “[n]early every major glacier in the world is shrinking; those in Glacier National Park are retreating so quickly it
has been estimated that they will vanish entirely by 2030”).
13
Id. at 25.
14
Id. at 65.
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many of these harms should be compensable, but they surely deserve
15
consideration.
16
The second category involves sea level rise. Sea level rise is one
of the most predictable consequences of climate change. Apart from
the unknown contribution of melting from Greenland and Antarc17
tica, the simple change in the temperature of the oceans will cause
thermal expansion, just as increased temperature causes the mercury
in a thermometer to rise. This rise in sea level will result in loss of
18
coastal lands, inundation of some estuary systems with salt water, salt
water intrusions into some drinking sources, and increased exposure
19
to flood damage. Sea level change may have particularly drastic ef20
fects on island populations. For example, the small island state of
Tuvalu (perhaps best known as the home of the “.tv” Internet domain

15

Other forms of ecosystem harm can also be anticipated. Biologists predict that
changes in growing season will be managed by some animals (those with small size,
short life cycles, and large populations), but not by larger, more long-lived animals
with smaller populations, resulting in major changes in natural communities. William
E. Bradshaw & Christina M. Holzapfel, Evolutionary Response to Rapid Climate Change,
312 SCIENCE 1477, 1478 (2006). Increases in wildfires are another form of potential
damage. See A.L. Westerling et al., Warming and Earlier Spring Increase Western U.S. Forest
Wildfire Activity, 313 SCIENCE 940, 942-43 (2006) (describing the relationship between
climate change and wildfires).
16
Some scientists predict a 2 m increase in sea level under a “business as usual”
scenario by 2100, but only a 20 cm rise under an optimum regulatory strategy. E.g., K.
Hasselmann et al., The Challenge of Long-Term Climate Change, 302 SCIENCE 1923, 1924
fig.1 (2003). The most recent IPCC estimates are approximately 0.2 m to 0.6 m, depending on the scenario. IPCC, supra note 4, at 13 tbl.SPM-3. The effects of sea level
rise are discussed in more detail in Susanne C. Moser, Climate Change and Sea-Level
Rise in Maine and Hawai’i: The Changing Tides of an Issue Domain, in GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS: INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE 201, 201-13 (Ronald B.
Mitchell et al. eds., 2006); DAN CAYAN ET AL., PROJECTING FUTURE SEA LEVEL:
A REPORT FROM CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE CENTER 5-11 (Mar. 2006) (Cal.
Energy Comm’n, White Paper No. CEC-500-2005-202-SF), available at http://
www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-202/CEC-500-2005-202-SF.PDF.
17
On the potential for catastrophic melting in these areas, see STERN, supra note
1, at 20-21.
18
See A. BARRIE PITTOCK, CLIMATE CHANGE: TURNING UP THE HEAT 264, 267-68,
278 (2005) (providing examples of land loss in areas including China, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and the United States).
19
See Kolbert, supra note 12, at 123-24 (reporting a British governmental study indicating that what are now hundred-year floods could become routine by late in this
century); see also PITTOCK, supra note 18, at 118 (stating that without adaptive measures, annual flood losses would increase from £1 billion to £27 billion in different scenarios).
20
See Culley, supra note 11, at 105-07 (describing the effects of sea level rise on
several island nations).
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name) is seeking ways to evacuate its entire population. Sea level
22
rise could also cause dramatic losses in wetlands in the United States.
Because the slope of coastal areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts is
low, a 40 cm rise in sea level could result in as much as 60 m of beach
23
erosion, at a cost in the billions of dollars. To get a sense of the potential economic impact, consider the following estimates regarding
sea level rise: “[A] half-meter rise in sea level would place $185 billion
of property and infrastructure in jeopardy by 2100, and . . . the financial cost of protecting all developed areas from a half-meter sea-level
24
rise would be $50 to $66 billion . . . .” Clearly, at least over a sufficient time span, these are very serious damages.
A third category of predictable harm also relates to water. According to the British government’s Stern Review, “[c]hanges in rainfall patterns and extreme weather events will lead to more severe impacts on
25
people than that caused by warming alone.” There are strong indications that climate change may lead to much more severe droughts
26
in some regions. Many areas rely on single-source water systems that
27
are “extremely sensitive” to climate. Severe stress on water supplies

21

Id. at 91-93, 106.
See id. at 100-01 (noting that “[a] mere 50 cm rise in sea levels would inundate
fifty per cent of America’s coastal wetlands”).
23
David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12-13 (2003).
24
WILLIAM E. EASTERLING III ET AL., COPING WITH GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE ROLE OF ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2004), available at http://
www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/adaptation/index.cfm.
This estimate may be on the high side, but even if we discount by a factor of two, the
figures are still impressive. On the other hand, given the Hurricane Katrina experience, we may be entitled to wonder whether flood control systems will necessarily be
effective.
25
STERN, supra note 1, at 17.
26
See, e.g., KOLBERT, supra note 12, at 108-18 (noting the “Rocky Mountain
states and California” as likely candidates in the United States); Carl T. Hall,
Global Warming Study Forecasts More Water Shortages, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 2005,
at A4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/11/17/
MNG4EPHK51.DTL&hw=Global+Warm; Michael McCarthy, The Century of Drought,
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 4, 2006, at 1; Richard M. Adams & Dannele E. Peck,
Drought and Climate Change: Implications for the West 3 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.economics.noaa.gov/
library/documents/benefits_of_weather_and_climate_forecasts/drought-climate_
change-implications_for_west.doc.
27
Kenneth D. Frederick, Water Resources and Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE
ECONOMICS AND POLICY 67, 68-69 (Michael A. Toman ed., 2001).
22
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28

is also a possibility in some parts of the world, such as Africa and Aus29
tralia. In California, shifts in seasonal precipitation patterns could
30
reduce the availability of water during the summer growing season.
31
Increases in flooding are also likely to be significant in some areas.
It may be difficult to tie any one year of drought or a particular flood
to climate change, but dealing with these threats will clearly involve
significant adaptation costs.
All of these damages involve impacts on basic geography in the
form of diminished coastlines, available water, glaciers, and tundra.
In most instances, rather than turning on the nuances of climate
change models, these changes seem quite predictable. Because we are
focusing on the context of compensation, we do not need to know
with any certainty that these effects exist. If they are sufficiently likely,
precautionary measures may be warranted, for which compensation
payments may be appropriate. If they actually take place, they can be
linked retrospectively with climate change because they all involve
sharp deviations from clear historical patterns. These are changes in
the sorts of local conditions one might expect to see in an atlas or
other geographic reference.
These “geographic damages,” as we might call them, clearly do
not exhaust the universe of harm from climate change or of potential
damage claims. Rather, they are something like the core of potential
damages. If we can map out a compensation system for these claims,
we can later consider how to expand it to cover other forms of damages.
B. Current Efforts To Obtain Compensation
Climate change litigation of various kinds is clearly on the increase, and the trend is to hold that potential damage from climate
32
change is a legally cognizable injury. Although the favorable deci-

28

PITTOCK, supra note 18, at 253-54. Note also that “[p]otential increases in the
frequency and intensity of drought across subhumid Africa are likely to increase desertification.” Id. at 255.
29
Id. at 256-57. China may be vulnerable to drought increases as well. Id. at 263.
30
Id. at 278-79.
31
For the most up-to-date information on how climate change will affect severe
weather events, see National Climatic Data Center, Extreme Weather and
Climate Events, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/severeweather/extremes.html
(last visited May 1, 2007).
32
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462-63 (2007) (holding that plaintiffs
did have standing to sue, and that the EPA, despite the agency’s objections, does have
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sions have involved issues of standing or administrative action rather
than liability for damages, scholars have begun to discuss the damages
33
issue in earnest.

authority to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles), reversing and remanding 415
F.3d 50, 54-56 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that defendant EPA questioned standing only
on the basis of causation and redressability, not injury, and proceeding to the merits as
in statutory standing cases); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp.
2d 957, 971 (D. Or. 2006) (finding that potential victims of climate change have standing); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (same); cf. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d
794, 796-97, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a state agency’s quantification of
harm from CO2 emissions). But see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp.
2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that public nuisance actions against utilities “present non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to the political branches, not
the Judiciary”).
At the international level, see Australian Conservation Foundation v. Minister for
Planning (2004) VCAT 2029 (Victorian Civil & Admin. Trib.) (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2004/2029.html (holding that the
impact of GHG emissions must be taken into account in the company’s planning decisions); Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Nigeria Ltd., [Nov. 14, 2005], No.
FHC/B/CS/53/05 (F.H.C.) (Nigeria), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/
media/gas.flaring.suit.nov2005/ni.shell.nov05.judgment.pdf (condemning, as violative of fundamental human rights, companies’ natural gas flaring).
Section 601 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987)
states that a nation “is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction
or control . . . are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of
another state.” This principle is based on the famous Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3
R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1906 (1941). In that case, the panel decided that
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 1965. The decision references both international principles and U.S. common
law. Id. at 1963-65. A claim based on the Trail Smelter principle has been filed against
the United States by Inuit representatives in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions
of the United States 5 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf. A summary of this and other recent litigation can be found
in ROBERT MELTZ, GLOBAL WARMING: THE LITIGATION HEATS UP 18 (Cong. Research
Serv. Rep. RL32764, April 3, 2006).
33
For such discussions, see Grossman, supra note 23, at 16-22; Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation Against Corporate
Defendants, 27 INT’L ENV’T REP. 936, 940-41 (2004); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of
Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1789, 1794-95 (2005); see also Angela Lipanovich, Comment, Smoke Before Oil:
Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation Is Feasible, 35
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429, 432-33 (2005).
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A recent case filed by the State of California illustrates this poten34
tial form of litigation.
In an action filed in federal district court
against leading automobile manufacturers, the State alleges two
causes of action for public nuisance: one under federal common law
and the other under California state law. The complaint focuses on
several key examples of damages. First, the State allegedly will be required to spend large sums of money on studies and infrastructure
changes to its water systems: the Sierra Nevada snowpack, which is the
source of much of California’s water, has allegedly been shrinking.
This decrease in snowpack is likely to increase flooding and interfere
35
with the State’s water system. Second, rising sea levels allegedly increase beach erosion and salt infiltration into the Sacramento Bay36
Delta, which will require increased expenditures on levees. Third,
climate change is allegedly causing more extreme heat events, increas37
ing the risk of injury or death (especially to the elderly). Finally, the
complaint alleges that
[d]ozens of other impacts have begun or are anticipated with a high
level of certainty, including increased risk and intensity of wildfires, risk
of prolonged heat waves, loss of moisture due to earlier snow pack melt
and related impacts on forests and other ecosystems, and a change in
38
ocean ecology as water warms.

The complaint adds that “[a]ll of these impacts are the subject of
39
State study and planning, which costs the State millions of dollars.”
Consequently, the State requests that the defendants be held jointly
40
and severally liable for monetary damages.
Claims of this kind face multiple barriers, including ill-defined law
in the areas of public nuisance, proximate cause, preemption, and
41
proof of damages. Future claims are probably most likely to be filed

34

Complaint, People ex rel. Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2006).
35
Id. at 10-11.
36
Id. at 11.
37
Id. at 12.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 14. The state also requests declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees. Id.
41
For descriptions of these problems, see Grossman, supra note 23, at 23-27, 33-42;
Oleszkiewicz & Sanders, supra note 33, at 940-42. The issues that will arise in this litigation were explored in more depth by other participants in this Symposium. See, e.g.,
David T. Buente, Presentation, So You Want To Try a Climate Change Case?, at slides
7-10 (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with author) (describing causation and proof of damages
problems).
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by “[c]itizen property owners on islands and in coastal states, those
that rely on snow pack or runoff for drinking water, and the states and
municipalities that either own real property or are responsible for in42
frastructure repair and maintenance for their populations.” The following appraisal of the prospects for this litigation seems plausible:
Past litigation in U.S. courts against industries such as the tobacco industry and asbestos industry proceeded cautiously at first. Plaintiffs adapted
to defense arguments, science caught up with the causation arguments
and discovery often resulted in unfavorable documents being produced . . . .
Causation remains a big obstacle for potential plaintiffs to overcome
in climate change litigation . . . . [P]laintiffs and their attorneys will draw
on the same lessons discussed above to pursue claims and will reach a
point where they can obtain significant discovery from defendants. Lawsuits do not have to be successful on the merits before they cause a de43
fendant to spend significant time and resources.

If nothing else, this litigation is likely to focus attention on compensation issues and uncover useful information; it may also increase
political pressure for a nonlitigation solution.
II. POTENTIALLY ANALOGOUS COMPENSATION SCHEMES
Climate change is an unprecedented global problem. Consequently, there is a vacuum of established rules and precedents dealing
with this precise situation. It makes sense, then, to consider the possible lessons of compensation schemes designed for other kinds of
widespread injuries. The compensation schemes I will consider involve a broad range of harmful events: terrorist acts, toxic torts, damage to natural resources, slavery and racial discrimination, natural disasters, and environmental damages caused by war. Clearly, none of
these situations is an exact fit with climate change, but each provides
some illuminating perspectives on the problems of designing a climate change compensation system.
A. The 9/11 Fund and Similar Compensation Schemes
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
44
Congress established a special victim’s compensation fund.
Com42

Oleszkiewicz & Sanders, supra note 33, at 937.
Id. at 943.
44
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, tit.
iv, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
43
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pensation was limited to individuals who were present at one of the
45
crash sites and who suffered “physical harm or death.” The statute
covers economic loss, which is defined as including, among other
things, medical expenses, loss of earnings, and “loss of business or
employment opportunities . . . to the extent recovery for such loss is
allowed under applicable State law”; it also covers noneconomic loss
46
such as “physical and emotional pain.” The law gives victims the alternative of going through the tort system, but tort recoveries against
aircraft carriers are limited to the insurance coverage of the defen47
dants.
A special master was appointed to administer the fund. The spe48
cial master issued regulations to govern claims that in some instances
seemed to go significantly beyond the statutory language. Although
the statute called for an offset for life insurance and pension benefits,
the special master reduced the offset to the extent of the individuals’
49
policy payments or pension contributions. The special master also
set an approximate $250,000 floor on economic recoveries, and established a presumptive schedule covering economic loss, based on age,
family size, and recent earnings, with a cap for the highest-level in50
comes. Additionally, the special master created a schedule for noneconomic losses, with $250,000 to each victim, and $100,000 each to
51
close relatives.
Apparently, the special master’s strategy was to
“closely enough approximate the range of tort compensation to make
no-fault benefits under the Fund an offer that could not be refused by
52
most eligible parties.” As it turned out, ninety-seven percent of the

(Supp. II 2002)). For an overview of the scheme, see Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A.
Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 303, 335-41 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds.,
2006). For criticism of the 9/11 compensation scheme, see Elizabeth Berkowitz, The
Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006). The opt-out cases are now being
considered in federal district court, along with claims for respiratory damages.
45
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §
405(c)(1)-(c)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 239 (2001).
46
Id. § 402(5), (7), 115 Stat. 237.
47
Id. § 408(a), 115 Stat. 240.
48
28 C.F.R. § 104 (2006).
49
Id. § 104.47.
50
Id. § 104.21(b)(5), .41, .43, .45.
51
Id. § 104.44, .46.
52
Rabin & Bratis, supra note 44, at 341.
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nearly 3000 surviving families applied to the fund, with only seventy
53
families opting out.
The 9/11 scheme is clearly distinguishable in important respects
from the problems posed by climate change compensation. The September 11 terrorist attack was a discrete event that caused indisputable harm to affected individuals. People caught in the collapse of
the twin towers died; those nearby may have experienced immediate
injuries. Thus, screening claimants was not a major problem. Also,
the 9/11 compensation scheme may have had a partially patriotic motive.
Nevertheless, a couple of lessons may be drawn from the 9/11
fund. Clearly, the threat of tort liability pervaded the construction of
9/11 compensation, and the potential for tort liability also will likely
prompt climate change compensation in other forms. Also, the 9/11
fund illustrates the importance of providing standardized damage
measures in the interests of efficient dispute resolution and fairness
among victims. Moreover, the fund is a useful reminder, given the
litigation orientation of American lawyers, that under some circum-

53

Id. The Price-Anderson Act (also known as the Atomic Energy Damages Act),
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000), is another example of a compensation scheme designed to
limit tort litigation in order to protect a critical industry. The Act caps the total liability of the nuclear industry for damages resulting from a single nuclear accident, in
return modifying normal tort rules to make it easier to establish liability. § 2210(b).
The purpose of the statute was to enable the nuclear industry to obtain insurance coverage. § 2210(a). The Act also provides for assessments of the industry as a whole
to cover additional victim compensation. § 2210(b). For further information about
the Act, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRICE-ANDERSON
ACT 4-9 (1999), available at http://www.gc.doe.gov/price-anderson/public-comments/
Nuclear%20Energy%20Agency/paa-rep.pdf.
A more recent compensation scheme presents a less happy picture. At the end
of 2005, the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA) was signed
into law. Pub. L. No. 109-148, Div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818-32 (2005) (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e (Supp. 2006)). The statute provides immunity (for anything less than willful misconduct) for pharmaceutical manufacturers producing vaccines and other countermeasures for a biological emergency such as a bio-terror attack
or pandemic flu outbreak. Id. § 247d-6d. The Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services seems to have broad discretion in declaring such an emergency.
§ 247d-6d(b). Once an emergency is declared, a “Covered Countermeasure Process
Fund” is established. § 247d-6e(a). No appropriations will be provided until after the
emergency is declared and the fund is established. § 247d-6de(b). Thus, there is no
guarantee that funding will be forthcoming, which could leave victims in the position
of having their tort remedies preempted, but without any alternative means of
compensation. See Brian Kurt Copper II, “High and Dry?” The Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act and Liability Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
24-28 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896299.
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stances, administrative compensation schemes may provide a more efficient and even fairer alternative.
B. Environmental Damage and the United Nations
Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was established after the first Iraq war to handle claims against Iraq for war54
related damages.
The United Nations Security Council held that
Iraq “is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of
55
Kuwait.”
According to the UNCC, compensable environmental
claims include
(a) Abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil
in coastal and international waters;
(b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or future measures which can be documented as reasonably
necessary to clean and restore the environment;
(c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring
the environment;
(d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical
screenings for the purpose of investigation and combating increased
health risks as a result of the environmental damage; and
(e) Depletion of or damage to natural resources.

56

These provisions gave rise to intense disputes about compensation
for damage to pure (nonmarketable) environmental resources and
for interim damages to those resources prior to restoration. The
57
UNCC ultimately held that these damages were compensable. One

54

For information about the UNCC, see United Nations Compensation Commission, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc (last visited May 1, 2007).
55
S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
56
U.N. Comp. Comm’n [UNCC], Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of
Commissioners Concerning the First Instal[l]ment of “F4” Claims ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/2001/16 (June 22, 2001), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/reports/
r01-16.pdf.
57
Cymie Payne, UN Commission Awards Compensation for Environmental and Public
Health Damage from 1990-91 Gulf War, INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y Int’l Law), Aug. 10, 2005,
¶ 7, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/08/insights050810.html.
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method used to measure the value of resources was the cost of mitigation measures, such as providing alternative resources, which was used
58
as a way to measure the loss of ecosystem services.
The UNCC
59
awarded approximately $5 billion for 109 successful claims.
There seems to be growing international recognition that “environmental damages will often extend beyond that which can be read60
ily quantified in terms of clean-up costs or property devaluation.”
Thus, harm to “environmental values (biodiversity, amenity, etc.—
sometimes referred to as ‘non-use values’) is, as a matter of principle,
no less real and compensable than damage to property, though it may
61
be difficult to quantify.”
Like the 9/11 fund, the UNCC dealt with the fallout from a discrete and readily identifiable human event. Nevertheless, the UNCC’s
resolution of claims gives us especially useful lessons for climate
change compensation. The environmental impacts of the Gulf War
were multitudinous and varied, presenting considerable difficulty for
damage assessment. The UNCC’s decisions are good precedent for
extending compensation beyond harm done to marketable resources
58

The application of this method of damage assessment is described in a recent
overview of the UNCC’s decisions:
Several claimants put a value on their temporary natural resource losses by
proposing environmental projects designed to compensate for the loss of ecological services that the natural resources would have provided, had they not
been damaged. Although the Panel viewed the proposed valuation methods
using compensatory restoration projects as “relatively novel,” it was willing to
apply them “where there is sufficient evidence that primary restoration will
not fully compensate for any identified losses.” Accordingly, the Panel made
awards that were quantified according to the cost of various compensatory
projects: a cooperative rangeland management program to restore rangeland
and wildlife habitat damaged by the influx of refugees into Jordan, and shoreline preserves in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In another case—Iran’s claim for
damage to rangelands from the presence of refugees—the Panel found it
more appropriate to use the price of fodder to calculate an award rather than
the value that Iran derived from lost ecological services.
Payne, supra note 57, ¶ 8 (footnotes omitted) (quoting UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth Instal[l]ment of “F4” Claims,
U.N. Doc S/AC 26/2005/10 (2005)). For discussions of the concept of ecosystem services, see James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 871-75 (2005); James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 309-13 (2001); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 890-92 (1997).
59
Cymie R. Payne, Environmental Damage at the United Nations Compensation
Commission 4 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
60
U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its 53d Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (cmt. art. 36, at 252 ¶ 16).
61
Id.
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to include harm done to environmental amenities. The UNCC’s approach to determining damages also may provide a workable model in
the context of climate change. By focusing on the expense of mitigating the environmental harm, the UNCC has avoided difficult problems of identifying long-term environmental effects and valuing the
resulting harms.
C. U.S. Experience with Claims for Damages to Natural Resources
The United States has considerable experience with compensation for harm to natural resources caused by incidents such as oil spills
and other releases of hazardous substances. The primary mechanism
for compensation in this context has been litigation by governmental
bodies under state or federal statutes. Notably, culpability has played
a secondary role at best.
Under U.S. law, compensation for nonmarket damages to environmental resources clearly exists. The default measure of damages is
restoration cost. As the First Circuit has explained,
the appropriate primary standard for determining damages in a case
such as this is the cost reasonably to be incurred by the sovereign or its
designated agency to restore or rehabilitate the environment in the affected area to [its] pre-existing condition, or as close thereto as is feasible without grossly disproportionate expenditures. The focus in determining such a remedy should be on the steps a reasonable and prudent
sovereign or agency would take to mitigate the harm done by the pollution, with attention to such factors as technical feasibility, harmful side
effects, compatibility with or duplication of such regeneration as is naturally to be expected, and the extent to which efforts beyond a certain
point would become either redundant or disproportionately expensive. . . .
There may be circumstances where direct restoration of the affected
area is either physically impossible or so disproportionately expensive
that it would not be reasonable to undertake such a remedy. Some
other measure of damages might be reasonable in such cases, at least
where the process of natural regeneration will be too slow to ensure restoration within a reasonable period. . . . [O]ne possibility [is] “the rea62
sonable cost of acquiring resources to offset the loss.”

Oil spill litigation also provides some interesting statements about
issues of proximate cause, which may well loom large in the climate

62

Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675-76 (1st Cir. 1980) (footnotes omitted) (quoting the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(f)(4)-(5)).
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change context. In Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., the plaintiffs were consumers who alleged that the Exxon Valdez oil spill had resulted in higher
63
oil prices. The flaw in their claim was the existence of intervening
causes:
In this case, the spill itself did not directly cause any injury to the appellants. Rather, plaintiffs alleged the spill triggered a series of intervening
events, including the decision of the United States Coast Guard to close
the Port of Valdez to facilitate clean-up efforts; the alleged decision by
refineries in the western United States to raise prices rather than to use
their own oil reserves to make up any shortage; and the decision of
64
wholesalers, distributors and retailers to pass on these price increases.

The court concluded that the “plaintiffs themselves alleged the existence of at least one intervening act causing the price hike: the alleged decision of California oil refiners to exploit the supposed short65
age.”
Benefiel was only one piece of the massive litigation arising out of
66
the Exxon Valdez spill. The district court held that some of these
claims were foreclosed by the rule pronounced in Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Flint, which requires that a person must suffer “direct
67
physical harm” in order to recover economic losses. On the other
hand, there is a recognized exception to Robins for commercial fish63

959 F.2d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 807.
65
Id. at 808; see also Adkins v. Trans–Alaska Pipeline Liab. Fund, 101 F.3d 86, 89
(9th Cir. 1996) (applying the Benefiel test to the lost-profit claims of an electrical company, a cafe, tourist businesses, and boat repair companies).
66
For an overview of the litigation, see Deborah S. Bardwick, Note, The American
Tort System’s Response to Environmental Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study,
19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259 (2000). The author concludes that despite the magnitude of
the plaintiffs’ recovery, it still was inadequate:
Based on the vast extent of litigation and multi-billion-dollar judgments
awarded against Exxon, a casual observer might acquire an impression that
the legal system fully compensated the losses suffered by those impacted by
the spill. However, the legal system in fact denied redress to many plaintiffs
who lost most of their livelihoods as a result of damage to natural resources.
Many plaintiffs also did not receive compensation for non-market-based, intangible values that the resources had given them.
Id. at 262. Bardwick calls for “statutes that are specifically written to address the legitimate claims of individuals who suffer significant economic loss as an indirect consequence of the disaster, and create a right for native groups to recover for the actual full
extent of their harm from loss of a subsistence lifestyle.” Id. at 289.
67
See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), 1994 WL 182856, at *1, *5 (D.
Alaska Mar. 23, 1994) (citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309
(1927)) (concluding that the Robins rule barred most claims for nonpecuniary damages).
64
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ermen. The district court held that this exception applied to fisheries
that were actually closed to fishing by the spill, including claims that
the market value of their subsequent salmon catch was decreased on
68
the Japanese market because of concerns about contamination.
Beyond the direct economic effects of the spill, Alaska natives also
sought compensation for the disturbance caused to their way of life.
The Ninth Circuit held that these damages were noncompensable:
Admittedly, the oil spill affected the communal life of Alaska Natives, but
whatever injury they suffered (other than the harvest loss), though potentially different in degree than that suffered by other Alaskans, was not
different in kind. We agree with the district court that the right to lead
subsistence lifestyles is not limited to Alaska Natives. While the oil spill
may have affected Alaska Natives more severely than other members of
the public, the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychological benefits in pristine natural surroundings is shared by all Alaskans.
The Class [of Alaskan natives] therefore has failed to prove any “special
69
injury” to support a public nuisance action.

Much of current law concerning damages to natural resources involves a connection to hazardous waste liability. Pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil70
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA), responsible parties, such as waste site
owners, operators, or waste transporters, can be liable for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from releases of
71
hazardous waste. The scope of this liability includes the reasonable
72
cost of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss. Section 101(16) of
CERCLA defines “natural resources” to mean
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust
by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States (including the resources of the fishery conservation zone established by the

68

Id. at *6. For a fuller discussion of the Robins rule, see Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon “Valdez” Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1994).
69
Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821c, cmt. B (1977)).
70
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)).
71
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
72
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C). Note that the statutory scheme imposes strict liability; no
proof of culpable mental state or negligence is needed to support a compensation
claim.

1624

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1605

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act), any
State or local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or,
if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any
73
member of an Indian tribe.

Under section 107(f) of CERCLA, compensation for injury to
natural resources is payable to the following entities: the U.S. government, any state for resources “within the State or belonging to,
managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such State,” and any
74
Indian tribe in specified situations. The statute creates no private
cause of action for natural resource damage. Authority to sue is
vested in the President—when suing on behalf of the United States—
or in the “authorized representative of any State,” who “shall act on
75
behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources.” Sums recovered must be retained by the trustee “for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of” the natural resources injured, de76
stroyed, or lost.
CERCLA provides compensation for injury to an important but
limited category of natural resources. Section 101(16) speaks of resources “belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to,
77
or otherwise controlled by” the government. This language seems to
encompass not only resources owned by a government, but also those
subject to the “public trust,” such as navigable waters, wetlands, and
parklands. Less clear is whether the language also includes resources
that are regulated by a government for purposes of environmental protection—such as endangered species, coastal zones, aquifers providing
public water supplies, and the ambient air—or that could be regulated
78
constitutionally.
How are the recoverable damages to be measured? Section
301(c) of CERCLA directs the President to promulgate regulations for

73

42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (citation omitted).
Id. § 9607(f).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. § 9601(16).
78
See Barry Breen, CERCLA’s Natural Resource Damage Provisions: What Do We Know
So Far?, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,304, 10,305-06 (1984) (discussing the “nexus requirement” of CERCLA’s “natural resources” definition). Another possible analogy for climate change compensation might be liability for cleanup of hazardous waste, which is
covered elsewhere in CERCLA. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (providing cleanup standards
for “hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants”).
74
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“the assessment of damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of”
79
natural resources. These regulations shall specify:
(A) standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal
field observation, including establishing measures of damages based on
units of discharge or release or units of affected area, and (B) alternative
protocols for conducting assessments in individual cases to determine
the type and extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction, or loss.
Such regulations shall identify the best available procedures to determine such damages, including both direct and indirect injury, destruction, or loss and shall take into consideration factors including, but not
limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or
80
resource to recover.

The “standard procedures” are referred to as “Type A” rules, and the
“alternative protocols” as “Type B” rules.
The President assigned responsibility for promulgating the regulations to the Department of the Interior (DOI). In 1986, the DOI belatedly published final regulations containing both Type A and Type B
81
assessment rules. Both sets of rules were challenged in court by state
82
governments, environmental organizations, and industry groups.
Major portions of the Type B rules were found to violate CERCLA in
83
Ohio v. Department of the Interior. According to the court, the “most
significant issue” in the Ohio case concerned the validity of a provision
stating that damages should be “the lesser of: restoration or replace84
ment costs; or diminution of use values.”
The DOI rules defined
“use value” as
the value to the public of recreational or other public uses of the resource, as measured by changes in consumer surplus, any fees or other
payments collectable by the government or Indian tribe for a private

79

42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1).
Id. § 9651(c)(2).
81
The Type A and Type B regulations have been codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11, under the title of Natural Resource Damage Assessment Regulations.
82
Type A rules for coastal and marine environments were upheld in part and vacated in part in Colorado v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In
1996, the Department promulgated further Type A rules for coastal and marine environments and Great Lakes environments. National Resource Damage Assessments—Type A Procedures, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,560 (1996) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1997)).
The court upheld these Type A procedures in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Department of Interior, 134 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
83
880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding in part and invalidating in part
the DOI’s Type B rules). This case was decided the same day as Colorado v. Department
of Interior.
84
Id. at 441 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987)).
80
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party’s use of the natural resource, and any economic rent accruing to a
private party because the government or Indian tribe does not charge a
85
fee or price for the use of the resource.

The state and environmental challengers in Ohio argued that
CERCLA requires damages to be at least sufficient to pay the cost in
every case of restoring, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the
damaged resource. Because, in many cases, lost use values will be
lower than the cost of restoration or replacement, the DOI’s rule
would result in damage awards too small to pay for restoration. The
court used an example—which may have been inspired by the thenrecent Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska—to illustrate the “enormous
practical significance” of the “lesser of” rule:
[I]magine a hazardous substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals and
destroys a habitat for seabirds at a sealife reserve. The lost use value of
the seals and seabird habitat would be measured by the market value of
the fur seals’ pelts (which would be approximately $15 each) plus the
selling price per acre of land comparable in value to that on which the
spoiled bird habitat was located. Even if, as likely, that use value turns
out to be far less than the cost of restoring the rookery and seabird habitat, it would nonetheless be the only measure of damages eligible for the
86
presumption of recoverability under the Interior rule.

The court held that, under CERCLA, the DOI was not entitled to
treat use value and restoration cost as having “equal presumptive le87
gitimacy” as a measure of damages to natural resources.
Primary
among the statutory provisions cited by the court was section
107(f)(1), which states that natural resource damages recovered by a
government trustee are “for use only to restore, replace, or acquire
the equivalent of such natural resources,” and that the measure of
damages “shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to re88
store or replace such resources.”
The court concluded that Congress intended “to establish a distinct preference for restoration costs
89
as the measure of damages.”
The DOI sought to justify its “lesser of” rule as being economically
efficient. The court replied as follows:

85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 475 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(1) (1988)).
Id. at 442 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 444.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000)).
Id.
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Under DOI’s economic efficiency view, making restoration cost the
measure of damages would be a waste of money whenever restoration
would cost more than the use value of the resource. . . .
. . . Congress’ refusal to view use value and restoration cost as having
equal presumptive legitimacy merely recognizes that natural resources
have value that is not readily measured by traditional means. Congress
delegated to Interior the job of deciding at what point the presumption
of restoration falls away, but its repeated emphasis on the primacy of restoration rejected the underlying premise of Interior’s rule, which is that
restoration is wasteful if its cost exceeds—by even the slightest amount—
90
the diminution in use value of the injured resource.

With respect to the determination of “use value,” the DOI regulations have prescribed methods to be employed when the damaged
natural resources are not traded in the market. One of these methods
is known as contingent valuation, or CV. Some parties in the Ohio
case challenged DOI’s acceptance of contingent valuation in the regulations. The court rejected the challenge, saying in part:
The CV process “includes all techniques that set up hypothetical
markets to elicit an individual’s economic valuation of a natural resource.” CV involves a series of interviews with individuals for the purpose of ascertaining the values they respectively attach to particular
changes in particular resources. . . .
It cannot be gainsaid that DOI’s decision to adopt CV was made intelligently and cautiously. DOI scrutinized a vast array of position papers
and discussions addressing the use of CV. It recognized and acknowledged that CV needs to be “properly structured and professionally applied.” It eliminated a feature of CV, as originally proposed, that might
have resulted in overly high assessments. We find DOI’s promulgation
of CV methodology reasonable and consistent with congressional intent,
91
and therefore worthy of deference.

In 1994, the DOI promulgated new regulations on natural re92
source damage assessments in response to the Ohio decision. These
regulations allow “trustee officials to recover the costs of restoration,
rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent re93
sources in all cases.”
90

Id. at 456-57 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 475-77 (quoting Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Final Rule, 51
Fed. Reg. 27,720, 27,721 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1988))) (footnotes omitted).
92
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (Mar.
25, 1994) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93 (2004)).
93
Id. at 14,264 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.15 (2004)). The 1994 regulations were
upheld in almost all respects in Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of Interior, 88
91
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The CERCLA regulations are echoed by a separate legal scheme
relating to oil spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 provides that the
measure of natural resource damages is “(A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged
natural resources; (B) the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restoration; plus (C) the reasonable cost of assessing
94
those damages.”
These costs are to be assessed with respect to restoration plans,
95
which are to be promulgated by federal or state trustees. Double re96
coveries are precluded.
The President must issue damage assessment regulations, and, pursuant to those regulations, a rebuttable
97
presumption of correctness applies to damage determinations.
One of the components of damages described above is the cost of
restoration. Arguably, only restoration can fully compensate the pub98
lic for loss of a natural area. Unfortunately, one of the lessons of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill is that our technological capabilities in the area
of restoration are still quite primitive, and may, in fact, be counter99
productive.
Paralleling the CERCLA regulations for natural resource damages, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) developed equivalent rules under the Oil Pollution Act
100
of 1990.

F.3d 1191, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For further discussion of the valuation of natural
resource damages, see Christine M. Augustyniak, Economic Valuation of Services Provided
by Natural Resources: Putting a Price on the “Priceless”, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 392-403
(1993); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering
Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493,
497-515 (1994). For more on the contingent valuation method, see Ronald G.
Cummings & Glenn W. Harrison, Was the Ohio Court Well Informed in Its Assessment of the
Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method?, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1994).
94
33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (2000).
95
Id. § 2706(c)(1)-(2).
96
Id. § 2706(d)(3).
97
Id. § 2706(e).
98
See Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration as the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage
to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430, 430 (1991).
99
See Marguerite Holloway, Trends in Environmental Technology: Soiled Shores, SCI.
AM., Oct. 1991, at 102, 103 (noting that the oil spill “tore off the veil of preparedness
worn by U.S. industry and by federal and local governments. Technology proved unable to contain or contend with the spill, and it is likely to prove inadequate again”).
100
15 C.F.R. § 990 (2006). These rules were largely upheld in General Electric Co. v.
Department of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court found the Ohio
ruling decisive regarding the general legitimacy of contingent valuation. Any claims
that a particular contingent valuation was performed without adequate safeguards
could be addressed in a later enforcement proceeding. Id. at 773-74.
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These compensation schemes for natural resources provide some
valuable lessons. Compensation should not be limited to losses that
may be measured in markets. Rather, the cost of restoring natural resources (or providing substitutes) is a plausible default measure.
Where restoration or substitution becomes impossible, contingent
valuation may operate as an alternative measure of damages. Direct
economic losses are also compensable, but not more remote economic harms such as higher prices to consumers. By allowing the use
of contingent valuation as a method for measuring harm, the approach to compensation for environmental damage from toxic substances and petrochemicals goes well beyond what I propose with respect to harm resulting from climate change.
D. Compensation for Natural Disasters
Steps can be taken to limit the human impact of natural disasters.
Nevertheless, harm to human life and property cannot be avoided
completely. This raises the question of compensation. The legal system provides a mix of several public and private sector methods for
compensating victims of natural disasters. Each of the methods that
has been used to provide compensation has its limitations.
The first method of compensation is private insurance. However,
the unavailability of insurance for catastrophic risks—due to expense
or underwriting risks, the exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract
from insurance policies, and the difficulty of handling very large
numbers of claims—creates significant hurdles to privately insuring
against losses caused by natural disasters. The second method of
compensation, litigation against responsible private parties, also has
its limitations. These include the need for proof of negligence or another basis for liability, limits on the financial assets and insurance
coverage of potential defendants, and other judicial doctrines limiting
recovery. Third, compensation might be obtained from the government through various routes: tort claims against federal or state governments for negligence (subject to immunity defenses), claims under
special compensation schemes established for particular disasters, and
claims based on constitutional provisions requiring compensation for
the taking (or in some states, damaging) of property. As two astute
observers of the compensation system explain:
In the final analysis, the U.S. has what might well be termed a patchwork
system for providing financial compensation for catastrophic loss: partly
tort, partly public social welfare benefit programs, and partly private insurance coverage (often mandated); in some instances federally-initiated
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and in some instances at the behest of state government. Inevitably, in
such a multifaceted milieu, where the tendency has been to develop discrete schemes in response to particularized categories of disasters (or
rely on general welfare schemes that were enacted without disaster relief
in mind), there will be ongoing fine-tuning of the system and a continuing dialogue over the efficacy of the measures in place. While the description of the U.S. system may not point to a single best model for delivering financial compensation for catastrophic harm in all
circumstances, its very complexity indicates the variety of pathways that
101
might be taken.

With respect to compensation for one type of natural disaster—
flooding—governments play an important role. Although the federal
government generally has no legal liability for failure of the flood control system even for negligence, it has often found itself in the position of bailing out flood victims with various forms of disaster relief.
The flood insurance program is intended both to regularize this practice and to provide incentives to municipalities and individuals to limit
their risk of exposure. The basics of flood insurance have been succinctly summarized by the Congressional Research Service:
In 1968, Congress created the NFIP [National Flood Insurance Program] in response to the trend of development and redevelopment in
flood-prone areas, the increasing damages caused by floods, and rising
cost of taxpayer funded disaster relief for flood victims. Today, the NFIP
is among the nation’s largest domestic liabilities, along with the Social
Security System and federal health programs such as medicare and
medicaid. . . . Federal flood insurance is currently offered to homeowner[s], renters, and business owners in over 20,000 participating
communities that adopt and enforce floodplain management regulations which conform to NFIP standards.
....
The NFIP serves two major functions: underwriting flood insurance
and leading floodplain management. Various entities have specific roles
to play under the NFIP. The federal government assumes all liability for
the insurance coverage, sets the rates, coverage limitations, and eligibility requirements, designates special flood hazard areas (SFHA) with the
issuance of flood insurance rate maps (FIRMs) and provides grant funding for mitigation planning activities. . . . Finally local communities with
jurisdiction over land use adopt, administer, and enforce floodplain development regulations.
The NFIP does not operate on the traditional insurance definition of
fiscal solvency; rather, it operates under a statutory mandate that premiums on pre-FIRM structures—i.e., structures built before the issuance of

101

Rabin & Bratis, supra note 41, at 356.
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a FIRM or before 1975, whichever is later—must be reasonable and, if
102
necessary, be subsidized.
103

Flood insurance presents a tricky set of problems.
If it is priced
too high, people simply fail to insure. If it is priced too low, society in
effect subsidizes individuals to build in high-risk areas. Obviously, the
solution is to price it “just right”—but finding the right price may not
be easy, especially since there is no private market to use as a benchmark.
104
Private insurance also presents distinctive issues.
The insurance
industry seems reluctant to provide coverage for large-scale natural
disasters. This reluctance may be in part because of the difficulty of
assessing future risks, or because of the underwriting costs associated
with maintaining large levels of reserve or reinsurance—not to mention competition from various government-subsidized schemes. In
the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Florida established a backup
fund for individuals who could not get private coverage, funded by assessments of insurers. (This bears some resemblance to the more familiar “designated risk” pool for car insurance.) The number of policy holders dropped by over ninety percent in just a few years, but the
remaining coverage still represented over $10 billion in exposure.
105
Florida also offers reinsurance to private insurers at subsidized rates.
Natural disaster compensation provides several key lessons for
climate change. Private insurance may be inadequate to deal with
large-scale impacts as opposed to more localized harms. Also, given
the variety of institutional forms for providing compensation, we
should not focus exclusively on the litigation system as a basis for
compensation. Because of the important role that insurance could
play, the compensation system should focus on those harms that are
not easily insurable (because they are too large, predictable, or widespread).
102

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE: THE REPETITIVE LOSS
PROBLEM 6-7 (June 30, 2005).
103
For fuller discussion of issues relating to flood insurance, see DANIEL A. FARBER
& JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 178-85 (2006).
104
For more in-depth coverage of issues relating to private insurance, see id. at
185-92; PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL
DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds.,
1998); Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 177-83, 19098 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006).
105
For further discussion of the Florida programs, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note
41, at 345-47.
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E. Reparations for Slavery and Racial Discrimination
A very different setting for compensation involves claims for reparations by the descendants of American slaves. The reparations issue
106
has given rise to vigorous scholarly debate. Some of the debate concerns the application of private law theories of liability in this setting.
More attention, however, has been given to broader policy issues,
which are hotly disputed. The argument for reparations is at heart a
simple one. We recognize today that slavery was one of the great
crimes of history, followed by a long and shameful legacy of legalized
discrimination. These wrongs have never been fully acknowledged—
not even in the form of an explicit apology—nor has recompense
107
been made. Opponents of reparations do not question the injustice
of slavery and Jim Crow laws. They do question whether reparations
would represent a sensible response. They see reparations as deeply
divisive, increasing rather than healing racial divisions. Opponents
also fear that the quest for reparations will discourage African Americans from assuming responsibility for their own futures. Finally, critics
raise a host of questions about how to calculate the damages for this
past misconduct and how to distribute those damages to current gen108
erations of African Americans.
Reparations have not yet gained widespread support (which may
not be a promising sign for climate change compensation). As Saul
Levmore puts it, black reparations may be “as unlikely to materialize . . . as a renegotiation with current American Indians regarding the
purchase of Manhattan Island long ago or as a recovery from present
109
Southerners for the firing on Fort Sumter.” Indeed, public opinion

106

For a sampling of viewpoints, see Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181 (2004); Hanoch Dagan et al., Introduction,
Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1135 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177 (2004); Calvin
Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 157 (2004); Michelle E. Lyons, Note, World Conference Against Racism: New
Avenues for Slavery Reparations?, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1235 (2002).
107
Some of the key arguments for reparations are made in ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 119-63 (2004); Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 980-1012 (2000); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the
Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 28285 (2003).
108
These objections are discussed in Brophy, supra note 106, at 1201-03; Epstein,
supra note 106, at 1191-92; and Massey, supra note 106, at 168.
109
Saul Levmore, Privatizing Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2004).
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polls show that only four percent of whites would support payment of
compensation for slavery (as opposed to the two-thirds of blacks who
110
would support such payments).
Nevertheless, there are some precedents for reparations. Florida
paid survivors of the 1923 Rosewood Massacre $150,000 each and
111
made substantial payments to the descendants of other victims. The
United States paid roughly $800 million to Native Americans for
wrongfully seized land as early as 1946, and, in 1998, it paid $1.65 billion to Japanese Americans wrongfully interned during World War
112
II.
The federal government also paid $9 million to African Americans who were denied treatment for syphilis as part of the infamous
113
Tuskegee experiments. In another gesture of political support, California passed a statute requiring insurance companies to submit re114
cords of slaveholder insurance policies to a central registry.
More
recently, J.P. Morgan Chase apologized for the actions of its predecessors in accepting slaves as collateral (and taking possession in some
cases); the apology was accompanied by a $5 million pledge for black
115
college students from Louisiana.
Finally, in a notable recent opinion, Judge Posner held that the majority of the plaintiffs, who were African American slave descendants requesting damages from companies that had participated in slavery, lacked standing or were barred
by the statute of limitations—but some claims, primarily those
brought by “legal representatives” and those asserting consumer pro116
tection violations, did survive dismissal.
Thus, at least a glimmer of
hope may exist for public support of some kind of reparations pro117
gram.
Some of the resistance to reparations might be muted through
creative benefit systems. Dean Levmore proposes a privatized repara-

110

Brophy, supra note 106, at 1184 tbl.2.
Lyons, supra note 106, at 1243 (noting they payment of compensation to African-Americans whose community “was burned to the ground by whites in 1923”).
112
Levmore, supra note 109, at 1303 n.50.
113
Id.
114
Lyons, supra note 106, at 1264.
115
Ashley M. Heher, Slave Descendants Attempt To Revive Reparations Suit,
MSNBC.COM, Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15037694.
116
In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759-63 (7th Cir.
2006).
117
Charles Ogletree also cites municipal, state, and federal legislation addressing
reparations. Ogletree, supra note 107, at 280-81. Moreover, as he points out, Congress
waived the statute of limitations in a suit involving discrimination by the Department of
Agriculture against black farmers in the South. Id. at 303.
111
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tions scheme that might avoid some of the political objections. The
scheme involves incentives for private financing—up to $10 billion—
for programs to compensate black World War II veterans for wartime
118
discrimination and to encourage high school graduation. We might
imagine a similar scheme to encourage support for individuals who
have had to relocate after their previous homes have become uninhabitable or risky due to climate change.
In some of the recent debate over reparations, there seems to
have been a shift in the rationale for reparation and the types of reparation sought by advocates. Some of the key goals are informational
and symbolic: to admit past wrongs and advance public understanding. In terms of actual compensation, the interest seems to be community centered rather than individualized, such that it becomes possible to think of affirmative action programs as a form of reparation.
Also, some advocates place greater emphasis on social welfare than on
119
the prevention of unjust enrichment or redress for injuries.
One of the lessons of the reparations debate is that the passage of
time makes compensation increasingly difficult. Moral responsibility
becomes diffused, and damages become progressively more difficult
to trace. Similarly, GHG emissions today may have harmful effects
over many decades, but delaying compensation in the meantime
would be a mistake: compensation denied at any time is very likely to
be compensation denied forever. Thus, the compensation scheme
should prefer ex ante measures of damages rather than waiting for
harm to occur.
Another lesson of the reparations debate is that “compensation”
can serve a number of functions in addition to payments that redress
identifiable injury. By focusing attention on the moral responsibility
of certain actors for the plight of other actors, it may also provide a
way of fostering socially beneficial programs. Thus, even if we do not
adopt an explicit compensation system, trying to assign responsibility
for harm to particular actors may be a useful exercise. Also, we should
consider a variety of methods for delivering compensation, not just
cash payments.

118

Levmore, supra note 109, at 1300-01.
See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 814 (2006)
(proposing “an alternative vision of the moral basis of reparations claims” that focuses
on legislative action rather than litigation).
119
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F. Toxic Torts
A fairly natural analogy to climate change liability involves litigation over harm caused by exposure to toxic substances. This litigation
has been pursued vigorously, though with varied success. In some
ways, the failures are as instructive as the successes, in terms of identifying the knotty issues that a compensation system should try to avoid
as much as possible.
In considering compensation for individuals exposed to toxic substances, we can begin by distinguishing between ex ante and ex post
compensation. Ex ante compensation provides redress for the existence of the risk before the risk has caused actual harm; ex post compensation provides for redress after injury has occurred. In the climate change setting, ex ante compensation would involve, for
example, the cost of constructing flood defenses. Ex post compensation would be assessed after the floods had actually occurred.
1. Claims for Ex Ante Compensation
Ex ante claims for toxic torts come in several guises. First, the
plaintiff may have an existing physical injury but be faced with the
threat that the condition may worsen. Second, the plaintiff may have
no existing injury or disease but may suffer an increased risk of developing a particular disease, such as cancer, in the future. The prevailing rule for cases in these two categories is that increased risk of developing a future disease is not compensable unless the plaintiff can
establish that the probability of the future disease is greater than fifty
120
percent.
Third, because of the plaintiff’s susceptibility to disease,
she may suffer present emotional distress, which may or may not be
accompanied by physical manifestations. This category is not very
relevant for present purposes; it seems unlikely that compensation will
be provided for the mental distress of contemplating future harms
caused by climate change. Finally, the plaintiff facing an enhanced
risk of future serious illness may incur present and future medical expenses for surveillance of the possible development of the disease.

120

This rule has, however, met some criticism. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman, Tortious Toxics, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 73
(2001) (explaining this probability rule and arguing that it “has hugely arbitrary and
inequitable results”). For example, in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394,
396, 413 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), the court upheld damages for fear of cancer where
the plaintiff already had asbestosis and had a greater than fifty percent likelihood of
developing cancer.
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This fourth category has received particular attention from the courts
and is also especially relevant for our purposes.
The prevailing approach to medical monitoring is illustrated by In
121
re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.
The Third Circuit held that a
medical monitoring claimant must prove four elements:
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance
through the negligent actions of the defendant.
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary.
4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early de122
tection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.

In most medical monitoring cases, “litigants pursued or courts
awarded the traditional common-law lump sum of monetary dam123
ages.”
In a few toxic exposure cases, however, litigants have requested, or courts have expressed their preference, that the defendant “pay the expenses [of medical surveillance] on a periodic basis
124
out of a court-supervised trust fund or similar mechanism.” Medical
monitoring thus seems to be a form of ex ante compensation, since it
is based on precautionary actions rather than on an assessment of actual physical harm.
2. Claims for Ex Post Compensation
The largest damages result from claims of death or serious illness
as a result of exposure to toxic substances. These damage claims are
also among the hardest to prove. One of the most serious sets of
problems relates to proof of causation. It may be difficult to establish
121

916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 852.
123
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 665
(1992) (footnotes omitted).
124
Id. at 666. The leading case on medical surveillance is Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987), which held that “the cost of medical surveillance is
a compensable item of damages . . . where such surveillance to monitor the effect of
exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary.” For a case rejecting a cause
of action for medical monitoring, see Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d
827, 828 (Ala. 2001), which held that Alabama law does not recognize a “distinct cause
of action for medical monitoring in the absence of a manifest physical injury or illness.”
122
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that a toxic substance is even capable of causing a specific disease, let
alone that it actually caused that disease in one particular plaintiff.
This question of general causation often involves difficult and only
125
partially resolved scientific questions.
Even when a general link between a disease and exposure to a
substance has been established, it may be difficult to show that a particular individual’s disease was caused by exposure to that specific substance:
Epidemiological studies may establish that a substance can cause the
type of harm suffered by a plaintiff, satisfying general causation. But a
plaintiff must still demonstrate that the particular harm was in fact the
result of exposure to a given substance. Epidemiological studies, however, can only attribute a proportion of the incidence of disease in a
population to any particular source. They are not designed to prove
specific causation. Specific causation requires a plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that particular plaintiff’s harm. Many courts interpret the preponderance standard
to require a relative risk ratio of 2.0 or greater—for example, a defendant’s conduct more than doubled the plaintiff’s risk of injury. . . .
Thus, if an epidemiological study indicates that exposure to a particular
substance increases the incidence of a disease among those exposed by
only forty percent, then a court will probably find that the plaintiff has
failed to meet the burden of proving specific causation unless more di126
rect evidence is offered.

There is considerable scholarly support for a different approach
to probabilistic harm. Rather than providing full compensation for
victims who have proven at least a fifty percent probability of causation
and none for those who have not met that burden of proof, the new
127
approach would provide proportional recovery to all victims.
Thus,
125

For a discussion of these issues in the context of risk assessment, see DANIEL A.
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 68-81 (7th ed. 2006).
126
Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1449-50 (2005) (footnotes omitted). For further discussion of
this issue, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (discussing “[r]easonable inference and speculation
in proving causation”); id. § 28 cmt. c (discussing “[t]oxic substances and disease”); id.
§ 28 cmts. a–c reporters’ note.
127
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 883 (1982) (exploring a “‘reverse-Sindell’
doctrine,” in which “uncertainty lies not in the defendant class, but in the plaintiff
class”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for
Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 418 (1984) (arguing in favor of a
system in which “the injury on which the victim of a catastrophic accident can base a
tort suit is defined . . . as the impact or exposure that planted the seeds of the illness”);
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of
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if there is, for example, a sixty percent chance that a victim’s injury
was caused by exposure to the toxic chemical, the victim would receive
compensation for sixty percent of her loss. Similarly, if the probability
is only twenty percent, twenty percent of the loss would be compensable.
When there are classes of potential victims with varying degrees of
risk, there is a strong theoretical argument for departing from proportionality. Rather, the optimal form of compensation in such cases may
be to assess the defendant with the full expected harm caused by its
128
actions, but to distribute the damages only to the most likely victims.
In this scheme, the classes with the highest risk level receive full compensation, starting at the top with the class most at risk; the court then
proceeds down the list, awarding compensation until the defendant
has paid the full expected value of the harm. This method maximizes
the probability that the funds will go to redress injuries that were actually caused by the defendant, and it correspondingly minimizes the
error cost that the funds will go to individuals whose harm was not in
fact caused by the defendant. The assumption is that with full information we could identify the cases of actual harm; the goal is to concentrate compensation on the defendants who caused that harm.
To take a simple example, suppose that there are two classes containing equal numbers of injured individuals. For members of the
first class (Class 1), the probability that the injury was caused by the
toxic exposure is 60%; for the second class (Class 2), the probability is
129
40%.
To minimize the risk of erroneously compensating someone
who was not really a victim of the defendant’s actions, we should fully
compensate members of Class 1 but provide no compensation to
members of Class 2. To see this, assume that we transfer a dollar of
compensation from a member of Class 1 to a member of Class 2. Dothe Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 858 (1984) (arguing that “the tort system cannot . . . do individualized justice in mass exposure cases under the conventional approach to causality”).
128
The argument for this approach is developed in Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987). As David Kaye pointed out to me after that article
appeared, the proof presented in the article is unnecessarily complicated. A simpler
argument, which could be easily formalized in mathematical terms, is presented in the
text accompanying note 129. Also, it should be noted, this solution assumes that the
goal is to maximize the amount of funds reaching individuals who were actually
harmed by the defendant. If the goal instead is social insurance, a different system
might be favored.
129
The difference might arise because the members of the first class had higher
exposures or greater vulnerability, or, alternatively, because the members of the second class have a greater likelihood of acquiring the injury from some other source.
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ing so decreases the probability that the dollar will go to someone actually harmed by the defendant from 60% to 40%. Hence, payments
to members of Class 2 would increase the error rate, and compensation therefore should be entirely focused on Class 1 claimants.
If we assume that the median probability of harm across an entire
group is 50%, then this argument provides support for the classic burden of proof rule: those who can show a 51% probability should receive compensation for all of their injuries, while those who cannot
make the threshold showing should receive nothing. Results differ
from the classic burden of proof, however, when the median expected
harm is not 50%. For example, if the median harm is 30%, then victims with a probability of harm in excess of 30% should receive full
compensation, while those with a probability of harm under 30%
should get nothing.
This model of liability suggests that it may be better to concentrate
on full compensation for the most provable harms, rather than to
spread funds over all possible victims. Thus, this model provides indirect support for the proposal in this Article that compensation should
begin with the most workable subset of climate damages.
3. Apportionment Among Defendants
Another problem in toxic tort litigation is establishing a link between a specific defendant and the release of the substance. For example, many hazardous waste generators may have shipped similar
materials to the site in question. Establishing ownership of the leaked
containers or the quantities they leaked may be quite difficult. A similar issue can arise in products liability cases. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the plaintiff’s mother was administered the drug diethylstil130
besterol (DES) during pregnancy.
Although DES was, at that time,
routinely given to prevent miscarriage, it is now known to cause a rare
form of cancer in some daughters of women who took the drug. After
developing that cancer, the plaintiff in Sindell sued eleven of the more
131
than two hundred manufacturers of DES.
Although the plaintiff
was unable to identify the manufacturer of the particular DES product
that her mother took, the court held that she had stated a cause of action against manufacturers of the drug that all used an identical for-

130
131

607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
Id. at 925-26.

1640

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1605

132

mula. Resting this holding on a broad social policy, the court noted
that the defendants were “better able to bear the cost of injury result133
ing from the manufacture of a defective product.” The Sindell court
then adopted a novel theory of liability by making each defendant liable for a share of the plaintiff’s damages, based on the particular de134
fendant’s share of the DES market.
Sindell has been followed by a
135
number of other courts, with some variations.
It is obviously impossible to link any specific GHG emissions with
any specific injury, due to the cumulative nature of the greenhouse
effect. Thus, some form of Sindell-like apportionment seems to be the
only workable solution.
Toxic tort litigation illustrates the ways in which compensation efforts can be frustrated when ex post remedies require difficult inquiries into causation. Ex ante remedies such as medical monitoring
avoid many of these issues. On the other hand, tort litigation has had
some success, particularly in terms of substances like asbestos, which
involve large-scale, frequently documented impacts.
III. CORE COMPENSATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
With the lessons of these analogous compensation systems in
mind, I turn to the problem of constructing a compensation system
for climate change. The proposal presented here is not particularly
ambitious. It limits itself to the most predictable forms of harm and
favors the use of the most easily administered measures of damages.
Given, however, that no system of compensation exists currently, it
seems best to begin with a system that addresses the core of the problem, bearing in mind that even a modest effort at compensation may
be politically infeasible.
The proposed definition of compensable climate injuries is based
on lessons from other compensation systems. In order to avoid difficult causation inquiries, time lags before compensation, and problems
of proof, the proposal stresses ex ante measures of damages such as
replacement or substitution costs. It focuses on widespread harms
that likely will be capable of standardized assessment, as opposed to
132

Id. at 928.
Id. at 936.
134
Id. at 936-37.
135
A good review of the early cases can be found in In re “Agent Orange” Product
Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 820-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Note that the most successful use of the doctrine has been in the highly unusual DES cases.
133
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highly individualized damage from climate change. Finally, it is amenable to implementation in a number of institutional forms.
A. Policies Favoring Compensation for Climate Damages
The tort system—and, by extension, other compensation
136
schemes—has several goals.
Probably the two most important are
deterring harmful conduct (the efficiency or deterrence rationale)
and corrective justice (that is, restoring moral balance by rectifying
harm). Loss distribution (which can be considered a way of providing
insurance against social risks) is another goal, perhaps more important in social compensation schemes than in tort. A final set of goals
is oriented to society as a whole: providing redress for social griev137
ances or exhibiting social solidarity with victims.
Corrective justice involves complex moral issues that are not likely
138
to be resolved simply or to everyone’s satisfaction.
Emissions of
GHGs were not made with the intent to cause harm to others. Prior
to the last quarter of the twentieth century, emitters may not have had
strong grounds for believing that their conduct would cause serious
harm. Nevertheless, the fact remains that they have caused harm, and
in the process they have enjoyed lower costs than they would have incurred by using alternative technologies or by reducing output. Thus,
there is a strong element of unjust enrichment, at least in some situations. For those concerned about culpability, apportioning responsibility on the basis of emissions after some cutoff date would be an appropriate response. One possible cutoff date is 1992, when the
United States and other nations entered a framework agreement to
139
reduce GHGs.
At that point, the international community had

136

For a general discussion of the tort system’s goals, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14-20 (2d ed. 2002).
137
For an insightful discussion of this solidarity rationale in the context of catastrophic natural events, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles of Government in Compensating
Disaster Victims, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2007, art. 1, at 28-31, available at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art1.
138
Matthew Adler’s thoughtful commentary on this Article explores these issues in
more depth. His analysis suggests that the climate change situation may be an imperfect fit with philosophical theories of corrective justice, although it appears that the
philosophical case for compensation at the international level seems stronger than at
the local level. See Matthew D. Adler, Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1865-67 (2007).
139
See Brown, supra note 3, at 10,741 (analyzing “the extent to which the United
States has advanced in meeting sustainable development commitments made in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992”).
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clearly identified the harm; any source of emissions after that date was
at least on notice of the damaging nature of the conduct.
It may be premature to make a judgment about the culpability of
GHG emitters. At the very least, it seems arguable that at some point
it became negligent not to take reasonable precautionary measures to
reduce emissions. Given the amount of misinformation that has been
spread by industry-sponsored groups, as well as efforts within the U.S.
government during the past six years to suppress information, there is
also at least the possibility of deliberate misrepresentations, as turned
out to be the case in the tobacco industry concerning the risks of ciga140
rettes. At this point, it is impossible to know whether there was a deliberate campaign of deception, but pre-trial discovery in one of the
nuisance cases, or intensive congressional hearings on related issues,
might shed light on the subject. Given the amount of money to be
gained in some industries by forestalling any serious response to climate change, it would not be surprising to discover cases of deliberate
deception of the public or improper pressure on governments.
In terms of the deterrence goal of compensation, it is obviously
impossible to deter conduct that has already taken place. Nevertheless, establishing a rule that requires compensation for past emissions
can provide a precedent for future liability schemes that cover other
emerging environmental harm. For example, the fear that another
country might emulate CERCLA liability provides an incentive for
care in disposing of hazardous waste, even if that country in which
disposal occurs does not currently have a stringent regulatory scheme.
Thus, the possibility of retroactive liability can provide useful incen141
tives to avoid novel forms of harmful conduct.
In the absence of

140

Consider, for example, a memo leaked from the American Petroleum Institute
about a campaign to indoctrinate science students and teachers about the alleged uncertainties of climate research in order to impede efforts such as Kyoto. See Laurie
David, Science a la Joe Camel: An Inconvenient Truth About One American Teachers Association, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2006, at C4 (describing the American Petroleum Institute’s
efforts to tout its environmental track record while challenging global warming). Notably, the National Science Teachers’ Association declined to distribute copies of Al
Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth because it considered the film to be “political” and because doing so might imperil the association’s capital campaign. ExxonMobil has
been a strong supporter of the association. Id.
141
It is also arguable that the liability would not be truly retroactive. As the Restatement drafters note, the “abnormally dangerous doctrine has a significant application in the context of environmental harms,” including application to activities, such as
toxic waste handling, that are not at all uncommon in our economy. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 cmt. k reporters’ note (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 2005). Applying strict liability to the production of GHGs arguably
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such a liability threat, when new environmental issues arise, those
producing the harms will assume that they have a free ride until a liability scheme that deals specifically with the new problem is put into
effect. This would discourage early efforts to reduce harmful con142
duct.
Thus, a general policy of retroactive liability for environmental harm might have valuable deterrent effects.
This deterrence rationale has some inherent limitations. The deterrence rationale clearly does not apply before the point when the
harmful nature of the conduct could reasonably have been discovered, and it applies with the greatest force to activities whose harmful
nature has already become clear. Moreover, once an effective regulatory scheme is in place, liability for further emissions may not serve a
useful deterrent function. But potential liability may provide useful
incentives in the period between the discovery of the harmful environmental effect and the implementation of an appropriate regulatory scheme.
Loss distribution seems to be most significant in two situations:
(1) where the precise incidence of the harm is unknown, but the private market cannot provide insurance (the insurance function); and
(2) where the victims of harm are markedly poorer than those causing
the harm (income redistribution). The income redistribution function is probably strongest at the international level, where relatively
affluent nations, like the United States, are heavy emitters, and impacted victims are poorer countries, such as Bangladesh. As the Stern
Review says,
[t]he poorest in society are likely to have the least capacity to adapt . . . .
Given that the greatest need for adaptation will be in low-income countries, overcoming financial constraints is also a key objective. This will
involve transfers from rich countries to poor countries. The argument is
strongly reinforced by the historical responsibility of rich countries for

could be justified on this basis, or on the basis of public nuisance law (as invoked in
People ex rel. Lockyer v. General Motors Corp., discussed supra note 34 and accompanying
text).
142
These concerns suggest an alternative way of measuring damages. Under section 120(d)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7420(d)(2) (2000), air polluters are
assessed a penalty for noncompliance in the amount of the economic value of noncompliance. Regulations implementing this provision were upheld in Duquesne Light
Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983). By removing this economic benefit,
the noncompliance penalty eliminates the incentive to delay compliance and also prevents firms from obtaining an unfair advantage over competitors who have chosen to
comply promptly. By analogy, entities that have failed to take timely steps to reduce
GHG emissions could be assessed on the basis of the economic benefits they have attained from the delay.
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the bulk of accumulated stocks of GHGs. Poor countries are suffering
and will suffer from climate change generated in the past by consump143
tion and growth in rich countries.

The insurance function is probably most appropriate for the
harms caused by extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, in which
the victims’ identities are inherently unpredictable. The case for insurance is weaker when harms are more predictable, such as the impact of graduated sea level changes on coastal areas.
Finally, the societal aspects of compensation must be considered.
Within the United States, at least, there is some argument for expressing solidarity with fellow citizens who are suffering distinct harm because of widespread national practices. For some, a similar sense of
solidarity may extend more globally. The potential social conflicts resulting from climate change also need to be considered. Individuals
who suffer loss or displacement due to climate change are likely to be
angry and resentful. This effect could be potentially destabilizing in
some parts of the world, posing threats to international and U.S. security. Within the United States, such effects are likely to be more
muted, but could still lead to political animosity and polarization.
It is also worth noting that the United States and other countries
have already agreed in principle to take some responsibility for adaptation measures in less developed countries. Article 4.4 of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states that “developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting
144
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.” Article 4.1(e) also calls
on countries to “[c]ooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change”; countries are also directed to “develop and
elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and
145
desertification, as well as floods.”
This cooperation mandate
amounts to a requirement of in-kind contribution to adaptation
measures. Thus, at least in principle, the United States and other signatories to the framework agreement already seem to have agreed to

143

STERN, supra note 1, at 37.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4.4, May 9, 1992, available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
145
Id. art. 4.1(e).
144
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compensation at the international level. It is also worth noting that
the parties to the Kyoto agreement have embraced the use of an adaptation fund, which is financed by a share of the proceeds generated by
146
the Clean Development Mechanism.
On balance, there seems to be a good case for climate change
compensation—assuming that a reasonably efficient compensation
mechanism can be designed. Clearly, some people have profited from
the absence of GHG limitations well after the need for such limits became clear. Their conduct will cause long-term harm to others. In
order to provide redress to the victims and provide an incentive for
care in dealing with other emerging environmental problems, compensation is warranted. The argument for compensation seems to be
strongest as applied to conduct that takes place after the harms of climate change are identified (so that emitters are on notice) but before
effective regulatory controls are in place (which would itself create deterrence).
Although compensation is supported by some strong policy arguments, one serious concern needs to be addressed. That concern is
that emphasizing compensation poses the risk of undermining efforts
to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This interference could stem
from either political or economic factors.
One political concern is that compensation claims could be polarizing, making it more difficult to reach agreements on mitigation
measures. It may be hard enough to get emitters to agree to future
restrictions without also requiring them to accept liability for past
conduct. This effect is not implausible, but it does seem rather speculative. It seems equally likely that the potential availability of compensation would drive emitters to the bargaining table earlier, discouraging them from holding out over mitigation measures. Alternatively,
the availability of compensation might reduce pressure from victims
for stringent mitigation measures that emitters find unacceptable—
thereby smoothing negotiations.
A related economic issue involves the potential effect of large
transfer payments. It is not possible to calculate the full harm caused
by climate change, but there is no doubt that it involves a very large
amount of money. Diverting massive financial resources to compensa-
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See Dean Scott, U.N. Climate Talks Make Some Progress on Adaptation, Joint Implementation, 29 INT’L ENV’T. REP. 867, 867 (2006) (explaining that the adaptation fund
agreement “lays the groundwork for project funds to begin flowing to developing nations”).
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tion might leave too little for adaptation or mitigation. This is a potentially serious concern, but there are several ways of dealing with it.
First, it might not make sense to try to provide complete compensation for climate-related harms. The wider the sphere of compensable harms, the greater the problems of proof and the greater the
administrative expense of providing compensation. This is one argument for at least beginning with a more manageable set of harms.
Moreover, restricting the set of compensable harms also serves to keep
the scope of liability within manageable limits. In addition, it may
prevent politically and socially disruptive effects such as widespread
bankruptcies or plant closings.
Second, in terms of adaptation, the easiest way to prevent compensation payments from causing interference is by tying compensation to adaptation projects. For example, possible adaptations for
harms relating to sea level change could include building sea walls,
where appropriate, or providing substitute wetlands through restoration projects. One precedent for this approach is provided by the
147
UNCC compensation system discussed earlier.
Creating such a tie
ensures that funds are not diverted from needed adaptation measures
into current consumption.
Third, in terms of mitigation, there may be ways to ensure that
compensation does not detract from emissions reduction or other
measures, such as the creation of carbon sinks. If mitigation is
achieved through a cap-and-trade system, we might want to provide
compensation by reallocating some emissions allowances from emitters to victims. Victims would receive financial compensation by selling allowances, which emitters would have to acquire for compliance
148
purposes.
Thus, the potential for interference with forward-looking measures seems to be manageable by restricting the class of compensable
harms and carefully designing payment mechanisms. Putting this issue aside, the case for compensation is at its strongest when (1) emitters are on notice of the harmful nature of their conduct, (2) an optimum regulatory scheme is not in place at the time of the emissions,
(3) the class of compensable harms is not so broad as to create overwhelming financial burdens, (4) claimants do not have the benefit of

147

See supra Part II.B.
If a carbon tax is the primary form of emissions control, then compensation
could be financed from the tax revenues, or emitters could be given a tax offset for
compensation payments.
148
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private or social insurance, (5) victims are significantly poorer than
emitters, and (6) the payment system is tied to the systems for mitigation and adaptation. This is not to say that these are necessary conditions or that an ideal compensation system would not be substantially
broader. These parameters do, however, seem to identify the most favorable circumstances for compensation.
Some readers may remain unconvinced that compensation is warranted even when all or most of the six conditions are met. Those
readers should, however, agree with the judgment that these conditions present the strongest cases for compensation on a relative scale,
even if they do not cross the threshold of acceptability on an absolute
scale. Skeptical readers should regard the remainder of this Article as
the answer to a hypothetical question: if we did want to adopt a system for compensating climate change, what would be the optimal
characteristics of that system?
B. Defining Core Compensable Harm
The definition of compensable harm has several objectives. It
should minimize the problems of proof and proximate cause that
plague toxic torts cases. It should also be broad enough to provide
significant relief to victims, but not so all encompassing as to create
overwhelming financial burdens and thereby distract from climate
change mitigation or other desirable social goals. A compensation
system will also be more acceptable to the extent that it adopts features of existing compensation schemes.
Given these goals, one desirable measure of harm is based on reasonable monitoring and adaptation expenditures. Awarding compensation for such preventive measures is supported by the following
sources: U.S. toxic tort law as it relates to medical monitoring ex149
penses; UNCC practice, in its use of adaptation measures and the
150
cost of providing alternate ecosystem services; and the preference
151
for replacement damages under CERCLA and other schemes.
Using restoration, adaptation, and precaution as the default
measures of damages also avoids the difficulty of determining, ex post,
whether an injury to a particular claimant was the result of climate
change. It is easier to show that increases in extreme weather events

149
150
151

See supra Part II.F.1.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-100.
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require higher levees than it is to show that a particular house was
damaged in a flood due to climate change. As the U.S. toxic tort cases
show, it is difficult to assess causation in the presence of scientific uncertainty.
These measures of damages also focus compensation in the areas
where harm is most foreseeable, and hence on the entities that are
most likely to be victims. As discussed earlier in connection with toxic
torts, compensating the most likely victims rather than spreading
152
compensation across all possible victims minimizes error costs. If we
identify adaptation projects required by climate change, we can be
confident about entitlement to compensation in a way that is unlikely
where ex post damages are concerned.
C. Possible Institutional Forms
The primary purpose of this Article is to identify the types of injuries that should be given priority in compensating for climate change.
A further question is, what sort of institutional framework should be
used for assessing damages, awarding compensation, and funding the
awards? A detailed discussion of this question is beyond the scope of
this Article. It is important to observe, however, that there are several
possible institutional frameworks. Hence, it should not be assumed
that compensation will be delivered through damage awards from lawsuits or some other specific mechanism. Each of the potential
mechanisms has advantages and disadvantages.
1. Litigation
Litigation is the most obvious way to procure compensation.
Claims in the U.S. courts involving damage to natural resources,
whether based on tort law or statutes such as CERCLA, provide one
possible model for such a system.
At present, international tribunals are unlikely to be able to compel payment of large judgments, even if they take jurisdiction. Domestic courts have greater coercive power. They may be able to handle some international disputes, assuming defendants are local
nationals or have sufficient local assets to be within the court’s jurisdiction and amenable to meaningful relief. They may also be natural
forums for domestic compensation disputes.

152

See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
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The great advantages of courts are their political independence,
their obligation to make principled decisions, and their engagement
with concrete disputes over injuries. Ideally, these characteristics may
allow courts to make socially desirable decisions that the political system is unable to produce. The major disadvantages of courts are their
lower degree of democratic legitimacy, their possible reluctance to
engage in large-scale innovation, and their inability to produce a
comprehensive compensation system.
Realistically, the greatest function of litigation may be to prod legislative action. A number of legislative compensation schemes, such as
the 9/11 fund, seem to have come into existence as a way of forestalling litigation against key private entities.
2. Administrative Adjudication
A legislatively established administrative system would offer several
153
It could operate under a more comprehenadvantages over courts.
sive set of rules. In addition, transaction costs could be lower because
agency expertise would produce more efficient decisions. It might
also be easier for an agency to produce standardized protocols and
payment schedules, which would simplify the adjudicatory process.
One model for such an administrative process would be the
UNCC. As described earlier, the UNCC handled adjudication of envi154
ronmental damage claims after the first Gulf War.
It seems to have
handled the claims reasonably efficiently and with general procedural
fairness.
An administrative system would also have disadvantages, however.
First, such a system would require legislative action (or an international treaty), which might not be forthcoming or could be flawed by
interest group politics. Second, administrative compensation systems
seem to have difficulty remaining current in terms of compensation
levels. Third, greater efficiency will probably result in less accurate
decision making in individual cases. Finally, the adjudicatory process
might be subject to political pressure, making decisions unreliable.

153

The issues involved in designing such a system are discussed in Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme,
52 MD. L. REV. 951, 964-78 (1993). Additionally, a sketch of one such system is offered
in the Introduction to this Article.
154
See supra Part II.B.
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3. Grants
Rather than relying on adjudication, a compensation system could
be based on an assessment system against responsible parties in order
to establish a fund, which would then be disbursed in a grant-making
process. Such a fund could be established as a litigation settlement,
through legislative, administrative, or international processes, or even
through voluntary action. For example, countries with high emissions
could make payments to the World Bank, which could then make
grants to finance adaptation measures elsewhere in the world. In the
private sector, individual businesses or groups of like-minded businesses with high emissions histories could make similar grants, perhaps with some government encouragement in the form of favorable
tax treatment.
These grants would not need to be accompanied by any admission
of liability, but could instead be considered a voluntary acceptance of
responsibility for past acts. Such actions might resemble the kind of
reparations sought by some advocates for past activities, such as cor155
porate complicity with slavery.
There are obviously limits to how
much we can expect in the way of voluntary action, but it is easy to
imagine various motivations beyond ethical responsiveness that might
be operative. Such additional motivations might include the desire to
project a good image to customers (or voters) and employees, to establish friendly relations with countries and communities suffering
damage from climate change, and to forestall coercive compensation
efforts (or at least accumulate credits against later compensation de156
mands).
The disadvantage of the grant system is that it decouples financial
contributions from determinations of damages. Contributions are
likely to be based primarily on either their acceptability to the grantors or as part of a deal between grantors and grantees. Total payments probably would fall well short of compensable harm. More-

155

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 115.
One feature of the compensation system that has to be addressed is whether
voluntary transfers should offset compensation requirements. It seems plausible that
they should, but it may be difficult to define precisely which payments count as sufficiently related to specific compensable harms. Relatedly, the “collateral source” issue
needs to be addressed: to what extent do payments from third parties offset compensation that would otherwise be due? For example, it is not clear whether, to the extent
insurance is available for compensable harms, the insurance should be an offset, or
whether, on the other hand, the insurance company should just subrogate to the rights
of the insured.
156
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over, any incentive effect is likely to be lost; the parties most in need
of an incentive to mitigate emissions are also probably the least likely
to make voluntary contributions. Another risk of decoupling is shown
by the United States’s bio-prevention compensation scheme (PREPA),
157
which lacks guaranteed funding.
On the other hand, decoupling
produces a less adversarial process for issuing funds, which could lead
to faster relief for the injured parties.
An advantage of the grant system is that it could be directed at the
victims with the greatest need—those with the fewest resources and
the most urgency to adapt. From a social welfare perspective, payments to those victims would produce the greatest benefit without the
expense of attempting to deal with less urgent compensation cases.
4. Declaratory Relief
Strictly speaking, declaratory relief is not a compensation system
at all, but there is something to be said for at least establishing a trustworthy system for assessing core damages and allocating responsibility
to emitters, even in the absence of any provision for payment. Such a
system would put pressure on emitters to engage in voluntary transfer
payments. It would also help highlight and particularize the harm
done by climate change, thereby encouraging the adoption of mitigation measures. Also, to use a phrase currently en vogue in Washington, it might at least produce a degree of “moral clarity” about responsibility for harm.
In the field of reparations, such allocations of responsibility take
the form of truth commissions, such as that in South Africa. Some
people believe that, by acknowledging the existence of victimhood
and responsibility, such truth commissions can play a socially integra158
tive role, paving the way for a more just society.
Because anger at GHG emissions is not likely to be targeted at particular individuals, some of the reparative functions of truth commissions are unlikely to be served. Moreover, individual victims will not
be easily identifiable. Thus, the “truth commission” idea may not have
157

See supra note 53.
For discussions of truth commissions and their role in transitional justice, see
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 57 (1998) (“If the goal of healing individuals and society after the trauma of mass atrocity is elevated, truth commissions could well be a better option than prosecutions.”); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY,
AND THE LAW 271 (1997) (listing truth commissions as one of several ways that states
can respond to a “popular upsurge of demand for the facts”).
158
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the same potential for healing as advocates claim it has in some other
contexts. Nevertheless, identifying responsibility for burdens placed
on other regions may still be helpful in setting the stage for negotiations or other compensation mechanisms.
D. Contributory Fault and Related Issues
Nearly everyone on the planet, in some small way, contributes to
the generation of GHGs. Some contribute more than others, but in
nearly every case, it is at least possible to imagine that the claimant’s
personal conduct might be used as a basis for avoiding or reducing
compensation. In other words, the claimant’s own activities may be
relevant to the availability or amount of compensation. This argument can play out in several different ways.
1. Contributory Fault
In some situations, the injured parties will themselves have made
significant contributions to causing climate change. This is unlikely to
be true for the poorest of communities, which lack the resources to
produce high levels of GHGs. But especially for claims within the
United States, such contributions to climate change should be taken
into account.
In practice, this should not be difficult to do. The percentage of
world GHG emissions produced by the claimant could be used as a
multiplier, with that proportion of the compensation claim being reduced. Alternatively, the deduction could be based on the amount of
emissions over the optimum control level for the claimant, so that
claimants who took feasible steps to reduce emissions would receive a
greater reward. Except for the very largest emitters, it should make
little difference which offset is used, since the claimant’s emissions will
be insignificant compared to the global level. Even a claimant who
produced a very large amount of GHGs—say ten percent of the world
total—would receive ninety percent payment on claims.
Simply to reduce administrative costs, it might be useful to preclude claims by large emitters whose share of GHGs is larger than
their share of climate damages. Doing so would tend to eliminate
cases in which major emitters are simply passing funds around between each other at some administrative expense. Such a rule would
be analogous to a common variant of the contributory fault system in
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the United States in which parties who are more than fifty percent at
159
fault for an accident cannot recover.
At the international level, for
example, claims between the United States and China might be
largely offsetting, and hence it might be easier simply to eliminate
them from consideration.
There are several arguments against eliminating claims by large
emitters. First, there might be considerable dispute about where to
draw the line. Second, emitters of equal size might not be equally at
fault. Third, one emitter might be much more vulnerable to climate
change than the other, so the damages would not be offsetting. On
balance, having a special rule for large emitters is probably not advisable, but the problem deserves further consideration.
2. Offsets for Climate Change Benefit
Climate change is likely to produce local benefits in some regions
in the form of less rigorous winters, more optimal levels of precipitation, or longer growing seasons. Should there be an offset for such
benefits in the compensation system?
The answer is probably no, because the compensation system covers only a portion of damages. The core compensation system proposed in this Article excludes many kinds of damages, but even a
compensation system that attempted to be comprehensive would be
very unlikely to provide full compensation. The costs of climate
change are simply too systemic and difficult to trace. Hence, whatever
benefits are obtained from climate change may well be countered by
uncompensated damages. Given the additional problems of proof
and administrative costs in establishing offsets for climate change
benefits, the case for doing so appears weak. A perfect system would
surely include all costs and all benefits experienced by the claimants,
but such a system is probably too complex to be manageable. A better
solution is to provide full compensation for a subset of harms, while
assuming that the remaining harms are likely to be at least as high as
any benefits. It might be worthwhile, however, to exclude claimants
that have experienced significant net benefits from climate change.

159

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 25 cmt. d
reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (“[M]any states . . . have adopted
comparative responsibility in a modified form, pursuant to which the plaintiff’s contributory negligence continues to operate as a full defense if it is greater than the defendant’s negligence.”).
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Those entities could be reasonably expected to use their benefits as a
source of funding for adaptation measures.
3. Moral Hazard
As the U.S. flood insurance program indicates, one unfortunate
side effect of a compensation scheme can be to reduce the incentive
160
for risk-avoiding behavior.
Similarly, a compensation system could
reduce incentives to relocate vulnerable populations, or it could lead
to overinvestment in preventive measures, such as sea walls to combat
sea level change. One possible solution, which was attempted in the
flood insurance program, is to couple compensation with acceptance
161
of regulatory restrictions. This has been, at best, a partial success.
Another option is to impose a duty to mitigate damages on injured parties. This would involve making an independent assessment
of whether mitigation measures are reasonably necessary in light of
alternatives or whether the injured party unduly exposed itself to risk.
162
The UNCC process provides a model here. In principle, this system
provides a complete solution. In practice, of course, it increases the
complexity and expense of proceedings, as well as the risk of error.
Dealing with moral hazard problems is part of the larger question
of how to efficiently establish damages. In an administrative setting,
the best solution might be to devise a schedule of presumptive adaptation expenses, and to give a limited opportunity for either side to introduce evidence of special circumstances.
4. Proof of Damages
Individualized proof of damages may be complex and difficult,
especially if the proof requirement includes evidence of mitigation.
One response would be to create a schedule of damages, as was done
163
with the 9/11 fund.
This would provide for a standardized method
of assessing, for example, the value of property lost to sea level rise,
the reasonable cost of additional levees and sea walls, or the cost of

160

See supra text accompanying note 103. In the case of flood insurance, too much
insurance may lead to undesirable construction in flood-prone areas.
161
Concerns about the effectiveness of the regulations are discussed in Congressional Research Service, supra note 102, at 19-24.
162
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
163
See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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providing compensating benefits through wetlands creation. It would
also address the mitigation issue discussed above.
In practice, such scheduling seems necessary because of the high
number of damage claims. A damages schedule is unlikely to be perfectly accurate, because it will reflect a compromise between precision
and administrability. As a result, it may lead to under- or overcompensation. Either mistake has clear fairness implications, and might
also create insufficient incentives for emissions controls or some degree of moral hazard for victims. But workability is probably more
important in this context than precision.
There is a natural tendency to want to fine tune the system in order to come as close as possible to the optimum level of compensation. This would be a mistake. Determining exactly the right level of
compensation in every case would be extremely expensive and time
consuming. It would waste expertise that could be more usefully employed to design mitigation and adaptation measures. It would also
probably delay compensation to the point of diminishing its value to
victims. It is better to have a rough and ready system of compensation
that provides at least partial justice and operates efficiently.
CONCLUSION
This Article assumes that GHG emissions will have damaging climatic effects. Even given the improbable assumption that the world
will adopt an optimal policy to mitigate further emissions, some harmful impacts are unavoidable. Whether to provide compensation for
these damages is a complex, difficult question, as is how to design a
system for doing so. This Article makes no claim to have settled these
issues. Rather, my goal has been to provide some context for considering the issues, to indicate something about the range of possible solutions, and to put forward one possible model for awarding compensation.
The proposed model focuses on the impact of climate change on
geographic features such as coastlines, wetlands, glaciers, permafrost,
rivers, and lakes. Widespread impacts on these features are already
underway, so these effects are far from speculative. As a preferred
measure of damages, I suggest the cost of remedial measures such as
monitoring, protecting, restoring, or providing substitutes for existing
resources. There is precedent for such ex ante measures of damages
in U.S. laws governing oil spills and hazardous waste releases, in the
United Nations Compensation Commission’s effort to provide com-
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pensation for environmental harm after the first Gulf War, and in
medical monitoring recoveries in toxic torts laws.
The alternative to this ex ante compensation is to provide compensation ex post, based on proof of actual damages from changes in
climate and weather. One difficulty with this alternative is that it
spreads compensation over decades, if not centuries. Another is that
it raises difficult issues of causation and complicated problems of
valuation. The ex ante approach delivers compensation earlier, more
efficiently, and with less uncertainty.
Such a scheme could be implemented in many institutional forms.
It could be the basis for liability determinations by domestic courts or
international tribunals. Alternatively, an administrative compensation
scheme might be used. The system could be given a more voluntary
dimension through agreements by responsible parties to finance
grants for remedial measures (perhaps as litigation settlements or with
the encouragement of either tax benefits or subsidies).
This is a fairly modest proposal, firmly grounded in existing compensation practices. It leaves unaddressed many other forms of injury
from climate change. But the difficulties of establishing any compensation system at all are formidable. It is better to begin with something unambitious and manageable than to aim for a possibly unattainable ideal. Climate change and its impacts will be with us for the
foreseeable future. There will be plenty of time to consider the possibility of expanding the system. The priority for now is simply to put
the outline of a workable alternative on the table.

